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A new bargaining set based on notions of both internal and external sta-
bility is developed in the context of endogenous coalition formation. It
allows to make an explicit distinction between within-group and outside-
group deviation options. This type of distinction is not present in current
bargaining sets. For the class of weighted majority games, the outcomes
in the bargaining set containing a minimal winning coalition are characteri-
zed. Furthermore, it is shown that the bargaining set of any homogeneous
weighted majority game contains an outcome for which the underlying coa-
lition structure consists of a minimal winning coalition and its complement.
The paper also introduces a new class of games called cooperation exter-
nalities games. For a symmetric cooperation externalities game conditions
are provided such that every outcome in the bargaining set supports the sa-
me coalition structure. This coalition structure consists of one coalition of
all players with an externality parameter higher than one and a collection
of singleton coalitions, one for every player with a cooperation externality
parameter lower than one.
JEL Classification: C71, C78
Keywords: Bargaining set, endogenous coalition formation, internal and external
stability
1Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg University, Warandelaan 2,
P.O. Box 90153, 5000LE Tilburg, The Netherlands.
2School of Economics, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD,
United Kingdom.
3Corresponding author: Email: e.a.lazarova@uvt.nl.
1
1 Introduction
Economic entities, such as medical practices, insurance groups, research teams
and coalitional governments, involve agents who generate value by cooperating
in groups. In some situations the groups that actually form will partition the who-
le population into smaller groups, while in others the population as a whole will
form one cooperating group. Studying this endogenous formation of groups and
predicting which groups will break up or will be stable is a captivating area of
research. In politics it can predict which governments can be stable. In orga-
nizational science it can predict which researchers can be grouped together or
alternatively should work alone. The value generated by a coalition in most cases
cannot be traced back to the individual efforts. This brings about an additional
question of how the group value should be translated into individual payoffs.
These two questions, of coalition formation and of value allocation, are in-
terdependent and require a simultaneous answer as argued by Maschler (1992).
They were addressed simultaneously in the seminal work of Aumann and Ma-
schler (1964) where an outcome of a cooperative game consists of a coalition
structure, i.e., a partition of the player set into coalitions, and a payoff vector
which divides the value of each coalition in the partition among its members. To
analyze the stability properties of an outcome Aumann and Maschler (1964) in-
troduce the Maschler bargaining set4. The Maschler bargaining set is the set of
outcomes which survive a specific bargaining process among all players. In this
bargaining process over a given outcome, players put forward “objections” and
“counterobjections” against other members of the same coalition in the coalition
structure of the outcome. An objection consists of a new coalition, of which the
objecting player is a member and the player against whom the objection has been
raised is not, such that all members of the new coalition can obtain higher pay-
offs than what is allocated to them in the proposed outcome. The player against
whom the objection has been raised can launch a counterobjection. A counterob-
jection consists of a coalition and a payoff vector such that the coalition members
can obtain at least as high a payoff as in the original outcome and those of them
who also participate in the coalition used in the objection can get at least as much
as they would have obtained if the objection had been executed. The player who
launches the counterobjection must be a member of the coalition used in the coun-
terobjection, while the player who has raised the objection must be excluded from
it. The bargaining set contains those outcomes for which each objection can be
countered.
An early work by Peleg (1967) shows that any coalition structure is stable for a
4Aumann and Maschler (1964) introduce several definitions of bargaining sets and study in
depth only one of them, which is not the Maschler bargaining set. The Maschler bargaining set
gains popularity and is studied in more detail in later works, e.g., Davis and Maschler (1967).
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coalitional game with a non-empty imputation set in terms of the Maschler bargai-
ning set, i.e., there is a payoff vector which allocates the value of each coalition in
the coalition structure among its members such that the coalition structure and this
payoff vector constitute an outcome in the Maschler bargaining set. This finding
precludes the use of the Maschler bargaining set in analyzing endogenous coali-
tion formation. Zhou (1994) offers a new bargaining set which has the desirable
property that in this setting it does not support all possible coalition structures. A
more recent work by Morelli and Montero (2003) introduces another solution con-
cept which selects “more desirable” outcomes out of those selected in the Zhou’s
bargaining set.
A common aspect of these bargaining sets is that they treat the deviation pos-
sibilities within a coalition structure element and between coalition structure ele-
ments in a symmetric way. This, in our opinion, is a serious limitation since in
many economic situations transaction costs and institutional arrangements will
require to make a distinction between the two. When considering a deviation
within a group, all subsets of this group should be taken as a possible threat point
against the group.5 However, when considering a deviation involving more than
one coalition structure element, our new bargaining set only allows a player to
join an already formed group. As a motivation one can think of prohibitively high
transaction costs in terms of licensing requirements, which make it impossible
that new groups are formed based on subgroups of distinct coalition structure ele-
ments. The different treatment of internal and external stability distinguishes our
bargaining set from the previously studied bargaining sets. Below we offer two
examples that illustrate the difference between internal and external objections in
an endogenous coalition formation setting.
Consider a parliament of representatives of four parties and a seat distribution
such that no party can form a government on its own. Suppose that there is one
big party and three small ones such that the big party with any of the three small
parties can form a government, and so can the three small parties together. Consi-
der an outcome in which a government is formed by the big party and one of the
small parties. Our bargaining set predicts that the allocation of government value
is different if the opposition parties act together or separately. In the first case any
of the government parties may threaten to split off the government by joining the
opposition to form a new government. In the second case, such a threat is only
available to the big party.
Investigating the outcomes in our bargaining set in the general setting of
weighted majority games is the first application that we offer. We show that in
any weighted majority game, the minimal winning coalition formed by the play-
ers with the highest weights and all other players acting alone leads to a coalition
5This is also the case in all other existing bargaining sets.
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structure that is supported by an outcome in our bargaining set.6 This implies
that a coalitional government based on the biggest parties in the parliament when
the opposition parties do not cooperate is stable. However, in practice one al-
so observes situations of united opposition. This raises the question whether in
any weighted majority game, there is a stable partition comprised of a minimal
winning coalition and its complement. We answer this question negatively for
the general case but for the case of homogeneous weighted majority games the
answer is positive.
Now consider a different setting of a group of researchers who have the same
research capabilities and only differ in a cooperation externality parameter. Some
researchers experience positive spillovers when working in teams and carry po-
sitive externality, while others tend to free-ride when they are in a team and thus
carry negative externalities. Consider a coalition structure consisting of teams of
researchers. For a coalition structure to be internally stable, there should not be an
internal objection of a researcher against another researcher member of the same
team, which the latter researcher cannot counter. An internal objection in a co-
alition structure element is analogous to an objection in the Maschler bargaining
set of the coalition-restricted cooperative game. A valid counterobjection in our
setting has an additional requirement over the counterobjection defined in the Ma-
schler bargaining set: the subset of the team used in the objection and the one used
in the counterobjection have at least one member in common. This type of mo-
dification was originally introduced by Zhou (1994) and it tailors the bargaining
set to select coalition structures with higher total partition value. In addition, a
researcher may raise an external objection against another researcher of her team
by threatening to join another team in the coalition structure. Such an external
objection can be countered if the researcher against whom it has been raised is at
least as desirable to the outside team as the researcher who launches the objection.
A coalition structure and a payoff vector such that for any internal objection there
is an internal counterobjection and for every external objection there is an external
counterobjection will constitute an outcome in our bargaining set.
This example illustrates the second application that is studied. In this applica-
tion researchers will differ not only in the direction of externality, but also in the
degree of positive or negative externalities that they cause. In the symmetric case
in which each researcher has either a fixed “negative” (less than 1) or “positive”
externality (higher than 1), the negative externalities weakly dominate the positive
ones, and in which there are at least two players who have an externality parameter
higher than 1, we find that the unique coalition structure supported by the bargai-
6Burani and Zwicker (2003) show that the same type of coalitional structure is both core and
Nash stable in the setting of hedonic coalition formation games with descending separable prefe-
rences.
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ning set is the one in which the “cooperative” researchers form a coalition, while
the “non-cooperative” researchers are singletons. 7
In addition to the distinction between internal and external deviations, we in-
troduce two types of coalitional rationality conditions, splitting-proofness, which
is a weak form of the coalitional rationality condition present in the bargaining set
studied in depth by Aumann and Maschler (1964), and merging-proofness. These
conditions require that total payoffs do not increase if a coalition structure element
is split in two or if two coalition structure elements merge.
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2
we formally introduce our bargaining set. Section 3 and Section 4 consider ap-
plications to weighted majority games and games with cooperation externalities,
respectively.
2 The Bargaining Set
We first give some basic notions. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} be a finite set of players.
Players can form coalitions S ⊆ N. The set of all possible coalitions is denoted
by 2N . A value function v : 2N → R, v(∅) = 0, provides the value each coalition
generates by cooperation of its members. In addition and without loss of genera-
lity we assume v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N. The pair (N, v) is a coalitional game. A
partition of N into non-empty coalitions is called a coalition structure. The set of
all possible coalition structures of N is denoted by P.
An outcome of a coalitional game is represented by a payoff configuration.
A payoff configuration is a pair (P, x) where P ∈ P is a coalition structure of N
and x ∈ RN is an efficient payoff vector for P, i.e., x(S ) = v(S ) for all S ∈ P,
where x(S ) :=
∑
i∈S xi. A payoff configuration (P, x) of a coalitional game (N, v)
is individually rational if xi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N.
For the sake of completeness and comparison we first present the Maschler
and Zhou bargaining sets.
For the definition of the Maschler bargaining set we follow Maschler (1992).
Let (P, x) be an individually rational payoff configuration of a coalitional game
(N, v). Let players k and l be two distinct members of some coalition S ∈ P. The
pair (T, y) with T ∈ 2N and y ∈ RT is called an objection of k against l in (P, x)
if k ∈ T , l < T , y(T ) = v(T ), yi > xi for all i ∈ T . The pair (Q, z) with z ∈ RQ
is called a counterobjection to the above objection (T, y) in (P, x) if l ∈ Q, k < Q,
z(Q) = v(Q), zi ≥ xi for all i ∈ Q, and zi ≥ yi for all i ∈ Q ∩ T .
The Maschler bargaining setM(v) consists of those individually rational pay-
off configurations for which each objection can be countered.
7This result is also reminiscent of the one described in Burani and Zwicker (2003).
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The bargaining set introduced in Zhou (1994) differs from the Maschler bar-
gaining set in the definitions of both an objection and a counterobjection. Let
(P, x) be a payoff configuration of a coalitional game (N, v). The pair (T, y) with
y ∈ RT is called a Z-objection of coalition T ∈ 2N in payoff configuration (P, x)
if y(T ) = v(T ) and yi > xi for all i ∈ T . The pair (Q, z) with z ∈ RQ is called a Z
-counterobjection to the above objection (T, y) in (P, x) if z(Q) = v(Q) , Q\T , ∅ ,
T \ Q , ∅ , T ∩ Q , ∅ , zi ≥ xi for all i ∈ Q , and zi ≥ yi for all i ∈ Q ∩ T .
The Zhou bargaining setZ(v) consists of those payoff configurations for which
eachZ-objection can be countered.
Note that the above condition will imply that any element ofZ(v) is individu-
ally rational.
Our new bargaining set will combine separate notions of internal stability and
external stability. First we present the internal bargaining set. The following two
conditions reflect the notions of internal coalitional rationality and stability against
internal deviations, respectively.
Definition 2.1 Let (N, v) be a coalitional game. A coalition structure P is splitting-
proof if for all S ∈ P, and all disjoint coalitions T,Q ⊆ S , such that T ∪ Q = S ,
v(S ) ≥ v(T ) + v(Q).
Let (P, x) be a payoff configuration of a coalitional game (N, v) and let k and
l be two distinct members of the same coalition S ∈ P. The pair (T, y) with
T ⊆ S \ {l}, k ∈ T and y ∈ RT is called an internal objection of k against l in
(P, x) if y(T ) = v(T ) and yi > xi for all i ∈ T . The pair (Q, z) with z ∈ RQ is
called an internal counterobjection to the above internal objection (T, y) in (P, x)
if z(Q) = v(Q), l ∈ Q, Q ⊆ S \ {k}, Q ∩ T , ∅, zi ≥ xi for all i ∈ Q, and zi ≥ yi for
all i ∈ Q∩ T . We say that an internal objection (T, y) of player k against l in (P, x)
is justified if there is no internal counterobjection.
Definition 2.2 Let (N, v) be a coalitional game. A payoff configuration (P, x) is in
the internal bargaining set BI(v) if
(i) P is splitting-proof, and
(ii) there is no justified internal objection.
A payoff configuration ({N}, x) of the internal bargaining set is in the Ma-
schler bargaining set as well: the definition of objection is the same and that of
counterobjection imposes the additional requirement that the coalition used in the
objection and the coalition used in the counterobjection are not disjoint. More-
over, {N} is required to be splitting-proof. For payoff configurations comprising
other coalition structures than {N}, there is no general relation since we require
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the coalitions used both in the objection and the counterobjection to be subsets of
one specific coalition structure element.
Compared to the Zhou bargaining set we have the following differences. First,
any coalition is allowed to object in the Zhou bargaining set; in our bargaining set
the coalition T used in the objection is a subset of one coalition structure element
and, moreover, must exclude at least one player. On the other hand, countering an
objection is easier in the definition of Zhou. We require the counterobjection to be
launched by the player against whom the objection has been raised, whereas in the
Zhou approach a counterobjection can be launched by any player. Furthermore,
we require that the coalition used in the counterobjection must be a subset of the
same coalition structure element of which T is a subset, whereas any coalition
which has a non-empty intersection with T can be used to counterobject in Zhou’s
framework. Given the differences it is easy to see that a payoff configuration
({N}, x) of the internal bargaining set is in the Zhou bargaining set as well: any
Z-objection can be translated into an internal objection, and the corresponding
internal counterobjection can also be used as a Z-counterobjection. However,
the reverse does not necessarily hold. The next example clearly illustrates the
differences.
Example 2.3 Let N = {1, 2, 3}, v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N, v({2, 3}) = 0, v({1, 2}) =
v({1, 3}) = 20, and v(N) = 21.
Consider the payoff configuration ({1, 2, 3}, (7, 7, 7)). It is in the Zhou bargai-
ning set: any Z-objection ({1, 2}, y) can be countered using Z-counterobjection
({1, 3}, z) with z1 = y1. Similarly,Z-objections using coalition {1, 3} can be coun-
tered using coalition {1, 2}. However, it is not in the internal bargaining set: player
1 has a justified internal objection ({1, 2}, (10, 10)) against player 3.
Consider the payoff configuration ({{1, 2}, {3}}, (10, 10, 0)). It is in the internal
bargaining set because there are no internal objections. However, it is not in the
Zhou bargaining set: the pair ({1, 2, 3}, (10 13 , 1013 , 13 )) constitutes a Z -objection
that cannot be countered. 
The following result is immediate.
Proposition 2.4 Let (N, v) be a coalitional game. Then
(i) (〈N〉8, 0) ∈ BI(v) ;
(ii) (P, x) ∈ BI(v) implies that (P, x) is individually rational.
Next we present the external bargaining set. Similar to the internal bargaining
set, the external bargaining set is based on two notions which reflect external
coalitional rationality and stability against external deviations, respectively.
8〈S 〉 := {{i}i∈S } for all S ∈ 2N .
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Definition 2.5 Let (N, v) be a coalitional game. A coalition structure P is merging-
proof if for all S ,T ∈ P we have v(S ) + v(T ) ≥ v(S ∪ T ).
Let (P, x) be a payoff configuration of a coalitional game (N, v) and let k and
l be two distinct members of the same coalition S ∈ P. The pair (T ∪ {k}, y) with
y ∈ RT∪{k} is called an external objection of k against l in (P, x) if T ∈ P, T , S ,
y(T ∪ {k}) = v(T ∪ {k}) and yi > xi for all i ∈ T ∪ {k}. The pair (T ∪ {l}, z) with
z ∈ RT∪{l} is called an external counterobjection to the above objection (T ∪ {k}, y)
in (P, x) if z(T ∪ {l}) = v(T ∪ {l}), zk ≥ xk, and zi ≥ yi for all i ∈ T . We say that
an external objection (T, y) of player k against l in (P, x) is justified if there is no
external counterobjection.
Definition 2.6 Let (N, v) be a coalitional game. A payoff configuration (P, x) is in
the external bargaining set BE(v) if
(i) P is merging-proof, and
(ii) there is no justified external objection.
Since no external objections can be launched against the grand coalition, we find
the following result.
Proposition 2.7 For a coalitional game (N, v) any payoff configuration ({N}, x)
lies within BE(v).
Note that the payoff configurations in the external bargaining set are not ne-
cessarily individually rational.
The new bargaining set B(v) consists of all payoff configurations that are both
in the internal bargaining set and in the external bargaining set.
Definition 2.8 For a coalitional game (N, v) the bargaining set B(v) is given by
B(v) = BI(v) ∩ BE(v).
We say that the coalition structure P is stable if there is a payoff vector x ∈ RN
such that the payoff configuration (P, x) is an element of B(v).
Unfortunately, the bargaining set can be empty.
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Example 2.9 Consider the coalitional game (N, v) given by N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7}
with v({1, 2}) = v({1, 3}) = v({2, 3}) = v({5, 6}) = v({5, 7}) = v({6, 7}) = 20,
v({1, 2, 3}) = v({5, 6, 7}) = 21, v({1, 2, 3, 4}) = v({4, 5, 6, 7}) = 30, v(S ) = 0 for
|S | = 1, and v(S ) < 0, otherwise. For this game B(v) = ∅.
First note that no coalition with a negative value can be a coalition structure
element of a payoff configuration which belongs to our bargaining set since such
a payoff configuration will not be individually rational.
Suppose (P, x) ∈ B(v) with P = {{1, 2, 3, 4}, {5, 6, 7}}. First suppose x4 = 0.
Then player 4 has a justified external objection ({4, 5, 6, 7}, y) against any other
member of the coalition {1, 2, 3, 4}. Next suppose x4 > 0. Then it must be the
case that at least one of the other players, 1, 2, or 3, receives a payoff of strictly
less than 10, e.g., player 1; and that the sum of the payoffs of two of these players
must be strictly less than 20, e.g., x1 + x2 < 20. Player 1 can then launch a justified
internal objection against player 4 using coalition {1, 2} and a payoff vector that
gives to both players more than what is allocated to them. Hence (P, x) < B(v).
Next consider the coalition structure
{{1, 2, 3}, {4}, {5, 6, 7}}. It is not stable
since it is not merging-proof: v({1, 2, 3, 4}) > v({1, 2, 3}) + v({4}).
In a similar fashion it can be shown that no payoff configuration belongs to the
bargaining set. 
However, the bargaining set is not empty in a coalitional game with three
players.
Proposition 2.10 Let (N, v) be a coalitional game with N = {1, 2, 3}. Let P be
such that
∑
S∈P v(S ) is maximized. Then there exists a payoff vector x ∈ RN such
that (P, x) ∈ B(v).
Proof. First note that P is splitting-proof and merging-proof. Recall thatM(v) is
nonempty for all coalition structures. So there is a payoff vector x ∈ R3 such that
(P, x) ∈ M(v). We will show that (P, x) ∈ B(v).
Let P = {N}. By individual rationality ofM(v), if a player i has an objection
against another player j at x it must be using coalition {i, k}. Because {N} is the
coalition structure with maximum total value, an objection of i against j can only
exist if x j > 0. A counterobjection in the Maschler sense must then use coalition
{ j, k}, which is also a valid counterobjection in the sense of B(v).
Similar arguments can be used in case P = {{i, j}, {k}}. The case P = 〈N〉 is
straightforward since objections are not possible.
3 Monotonic Proper Simple Games
First we provide some basic definitions. A coalitional game (N, v) is called simple
if v(∅) = 0, v(N) = 1, and v(S ) ∈ {0, 1}, otherwise. A simple game is monotonic
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if v(T ) = 1 whenever v(S ) = 1 for some S ⊆ T . We denote the set of winning
coalitions in a simple game byW := {S ∈ 2N | v(S ) = 1} and byWm := {S ∈
2N | v(S ) = 1 and v(T ) = 0 for all T ( S } the set of minimal winning coalitions.
A simple game is proper if for all S ,T ∈ W it holds that S ∩ T , ∅.
We can establish the following result with respect to monotonic proper simple
games.
Theorem 3.1 Let (N, v) be a monotonic proper simple game. Then
({N}, x) ∈ B(v)⇐⇒ ({N}, x) ∈ M(v).
Proof. We have already seen that for general coalitional games ({N}, x) ∈ B(v)
implies ({N}, x) ∈ M(v). To show the converse, consider a payoff configuration
({N}, x) ∈ M(v). Proposition 2.7 gives that ({N}, x) ∈ BE(v). Next we show that
({N}, x) ∈ BI(v). In all proper simple games {N} is splitting-proof. Furthermore,
every internal objection can be countered. Let (T, y) be an internal objection of
player k against player l. Any internal objection is also a Maschler objection.
Since ({N}, x) ∈ M(v), there exists a counterobjection (Q, z) in the Maschler sense.
We have to find a counterobjection (Q̃, z̃) in the new sense. If Q ∩ T , ∅, we can
take (Q̃, z̃) = (Q, z). So assume Q ∩ T = ∅. Since ({N}, x) is individually rational,
it follows that T ∈ W. Then by properness v(Q) = 0, and by individual rationality
zi = xi = 0 for all i ∈ Q. Since v(T ) > x(T ), there must be a player j ∈ N \ T
such that x j > 0. Player k can launch an objection against player j by (T, y) as
well. Let (Q′, z′) be the counterobjection of player j in the Maschler sense. Then,
Q′ ∈ W and by properness Q′ ∩ T , ∅. Monotonicity implies that Q′ ∪ {l} ∈ W.
So we can take Q̃ = Q′ ∪ {l} and z̃ such that z̃i = z′i for all i ∈ Q′ and z̃l = xl = 0.
Note that Theorem 3.1 implies that the bargaining set is non-empty for all
monotonic proper simple games.
Next we provide a characterization of the payoff configurations in the bargai-
ning set of a weighted majority game that contain a minimal winning coalition as
a coalition structure element . A weighted majority game (N, v) is a simple game
for which there exists a vector of weights w ∈ RN+ and a threshold q ∈ R+ with
0 ≤ q ≤ w(N) such that S ∈ W if and only if w(S ) ≥ q. The pair (q; w) is called a
representation of weighted majority game (N, v). Let S ∈ Wm and let P ∈ P with
S ∈ P. We denote the set of members of S who can make another coalition in P
winning by joining it E(S , P), i.e.,
E(S , P) = {i ∈ S | v(T ∪ {i}) = 1 for some T ∈ P \ {S }}.
Further we denote the indicator vector of a coalition S ∈ 2N by eS , i.e., eS (i) = 1
if i ∈ S and eS (i) = 0 if i ∈ N \ S .
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Theorem 3.2 Let (N, v) be a proper weighted majority game. Let S ∈ Wm and
let P ∈ P be a coalition structure with S ∈ P. Then {(P, x) | x ∈ RN}∩B(v) equals:
(i) {(P, x) | x ∈ RN+ , x(S ) = 1, x(N \ S ) = 0} if E(S , P) = ∅,
(ii) {(P, ei)} if E(S , P) = {i},
(iii) ∅ if E(S , P) ( S and |E(S , P)| ≥ 2,
(iv) {(P, 1|S | eS )} if E(S , P) = S and |E(S , P)| ≥ 2.
Proof. Observe that P is robust against merging and splitting. Let (P, x) be a
payoff configuration in the bargaining set. It is immediate that x ∈ RN+ , x(S ) = 1,
and x(N \ S ) = 0. Clearly, there are no internal objections. Moreover, external
objections can be made only by members of E(S , P) who are allocated less than
one.
If E(S , P) = ∅, there are no further requirements for (P, x) being an element of
the bargaining set. Hence we are in case (i).
If E(S , P) = {i} and furthermore E(S , P) ( S , then player i has a justified
external objection against any player in S \E(S , P) unless xi equals 1. If E(S , P) =
S = {i}, the only feasible payoff configuration is (P, ei). We are in case (ii).
If E(S , P) ( S and |E(S , P)| ≥ 2, then there are at least two distinct players
i and j in E(S , P) who have justified external objections against any player in
S \ E(S , P), unless both i and j have payoffs equal to 1. Since we have established
above that x ∈ RN+ and x(S ) = 1, xi = x j = 1 is not feasible. This gives case (iii).
If E(S , P) = S and |E(S , P)| ≥ 2, let i ∈ S and let (T ∪ {i}, y) be an objection
against another player j in S . Clearly, y(T ) equals 1 − xi − ε for some ε > 0. A
counterobjection exists if 1− xi − ε+ x j ≤ 1, i.e., x j ≤ xi + ε. From this argument,
we may conclude that xi = x j for all i, j ∈ S . Hence we are in case (iv).
The following example illustrates the above result.
Example 3.3 Let (6; 3, 2, 2, 2, 1) be a representation of a proper weighted majori-
ty game.
There are three types of minimal winning coalitions: a coalition formed by
all players with weight 2; coalitions formed by the player with weight 3 and two
players with weight 2; and coalitions formed by the player with weight 3, a player
with weight 2 and the player with weight 1. Depending on the type of the minimal
winning coalition and the coalitions formed by the players outside the minimal
winning coalition, there are six types of coalition structures that contain a minimal
winning coalition. We will discuss an example of each of the six types.
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First, consider the minimal winning coalition S 1 = {2, 3, 4} and the coalition
structure P1 =
{{2, 3, 4}, {1}, {5}}. Clearly, E(S 1, P1) = ∅ and we are in case (i)
of Theorem 3.2. The payoff configurations in the set {(P1, x) | x ∈ RN+ , x(S 1) =
1, x(N \ S 1) = 0} are elements of the bargaining set.
The other coalition structure that contains the same minimal winning coalition
is P′1 =
({{2, 3, 4}, {1, 5}}). Since E(S 1, P′1) = S 1, we are in case (iv) of Theorem






3 , 0) is in the bargaining set: internal
objections are not possible and any external objection can be countered.
Next consider the minimal winning coalition S 2 = {{1, 2, 3} and the coaliti-
on structure P2 =
{{1, 2, 3}, {4}, {5}}. Since E(S 2, P2) = ∅, we are in case (i) of
Theorem 3.2
Furthermore, consider the coalition structure P′2 =
{{1, 2, 3}, {4, 5}}. Here
E(S 2, P′2) = {1}. Clearly, we are in case (ii) of Theorem 3.2. The payoff con-
figuration (P′2, (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) is in the bargaining set since internal and external
objections are not possible.
Last consider the minimal winning coalition S 3 = {1, 2, 5} and the coalition
structure P3 =
{{1, 2, 5}, {3}, {4}}. Since E(S 3, P3) = ∅, we are in case (i) of Theo-
rem 3.2.
Consider the coalition structure P′3 =
{{1, 2, 5}, {3, 4}}. In this coalition struc-
ture E(S 3, P′3) = {1, 2}. Since |E(S 3, P′3)| = 2 and E(S 3, P′3) ( S 3, we are in case
(iii) of Theorem 3.2. There is no payoff configuration in the bargaining set pertai-
ning to P3 since either player 1 or player 2 can have a justified external objection
against player 5. 
The next result concerns types of stable coalition structures of any proper
weighted majority game.
Theorem 3.4 Let (q; w) with w1 ≥ . . . ≥ wn be a representation of a proper
weighted majority game (N, v). Then the coalition structure {{1, 2, . . . , k}, {k + 1},
{k + 2}, . . . , {n}} with k such that {1, 2, . . . , k} ∈ Wm is stable.
Proof. Consider the coalition structure P = {{1, 2, . . . , k}, {k + 1}, {k + 2}, . . . , {n}}
with k such that {1, 2, . . . , k} ∈ Wm. First, assume w1 + wk+1 < q. Then the payoff
configuration (P, (1, 0, . . . , 0)) is an element of the bargaining set: no player can
raise an objection. Next, assume w1 + wk+1 ≥ q. Hence, w1 + w2 ≥ q and therefore
k ≤ 2. If k = 1 or if both k = 2 and w2 + wk+1 < q, ( P, (1, 0, . . . , 0)) ∈ B(v). If
k = 2 and w2 + wk+1 ≥ q, then (P, (12 , 12 , 0, . . . , 0)) is an element of the bargaining
set. Hence P is stable.
Theorem 3.4 implies that the coalition structure containing the minimal win-
ning coalition formed by the players with the highest weights and the rest of the
players as singletons is stable in any proper weighed majority game.
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In the remainder of this section we address the question whether for any pro-
per weighted majority game, there is a stable coalition structure consisting of a
minimal winning coalition and its complement. The following example illustrates
that this is not true for the general class of proper weighted majority games.
Example 3.5 Let (11; 4, 4, 2, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) be a representation of a proper
weighted majority game.
We provide the main arguments why coalition structures containing a minimal
winning coalition and its complement are not stable. We distinguish between
minimal winning coalitions with weight 11 and minimal winning coalitions with
weight 12.
A minimal winning coalition with weight 11 always contains a player with
weight 1 and at least two players with weights higher than 1. At least one of these
two players with weight higher than 1 has a justified external objection against
the player with weight 1. An example is the payoff configuration ({{1, 3, 4, 5, 6},
{2, 7, 8, 9, 10}} , (1, 0, . . . , 0)): player 3 has a justified objection against player 6.
A minimal winning coalition with weight 12 consists of all players with weight
4 and two players with weight 2. At least one the players with weight 4 has a jus-
tified external objection against a player with weight 2. For instance, consider the
payoff configuration ({{1, 2, 3, 4}, {5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11}}, (1, 0, . . . , 0)) where player
2 has a justified external objection against player 3. 
There is however a stable coalition structure consisting of a minimal winning
coalition and its complement for all proper and homogenous weighted majority
games. A proper weighted majority game (N, v) is homogeneous if there exists a
representation (q; w) such that w(S ) = q for all S ∈ Wm.
Theorem 3.6 Let (N, v) be a proper homogeneous weighted majority game. Then
there exists a minimal winning coalition S such that the coalition structure {S ,N \
S } is stable.
Proof. Let (q; w) be a representation of (N, v). For ease of exposition all players i ∈
N for whom wi +w(N)−q ≥ q are called strong and all others weak. Homogeneity
implies that strong players in a minimal winning coalition S are exactly those
players in the set E(S , {S ,N \ S }).
If there are no strong players, it is easily derived that any coalition structure
containing a minimal winning coalition is stable.
So we may assume there are strong players. If the set of strong players is win-
ning, following the same line of argument as in the proof of case (iv) in Theorem
3.2, there exists a minimal winning coalition S consisting of strong players only,
and, ({S ,N \ S }, 1S eS ) ∈ B(v). If the set of strong players is losing, take a minimal
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winning coalition T ∈ Wm which contains all strong players. Take any strong
player i ∈ T . Then the coalition (N \ T )∪ {i} is winning. This coalition contains a
minimal winning coalition S with i ∈ S . Again using the same argument as in the
proof of case (ii) of Theorem 3.2, one can check that ({S ,N \ S }, ei) ∈ B(v).
Finally, it is easy to see that there is a stable coalition structure consisting of
a minimal winning coalition and its complement for all strong weighted majority
games. A weighted majority game (N, v) is strong if S < W implies N \ S ∈ W.
Since E(S , P) = S for all S ∈ Wm the coalition structure {S ,N \ S } is stable for
any minimal winning coalition S : either |S | = 1 and we are in case (ii) or |S | ≥ 2
and we are in case (iv) of Theorem 3.2.
4 Cooperation Externalities Games
We now construct a special type of games, cooperation externalities games, that
model settings in which the players only differ in a cooperation externality para-
meter. The cooperation externality parameter captures either negative externalities
or positive externalities that a player carries in cooperation with others. If a play-
er’s marginal contribution to a group value is positive, we say that she carries
positive externality with respect to that group. Conversely, if a player’s contribu-
tion is negative, we say that she carries negative externality with respect to that
group. If a player’s marginal contribution to a group value is zero, then we say
that the player is externality-free with respect to that group. A player may carry
positive externality in one group and negative externality in another group depen-
ding on the composition of the group. Players may not only vary in the direction
but also in the degree of cooperation externality they cause. Apart from their hete-
rogeneity in the cooperation externalities, which becomes evident only when they
are members of a group, players are homogeneous. These ideas are captured in
the characteristic function of the coalitional game with cooperation externalities
given below.
Let N be the set of players. The vector ε ∈ RN+ with 0 ≤ εi ≤ 2 for all i ∈ N is
the vector of cooperation externality parameters of the players. The cooperation
externalities game (N, vε) is defined by
v(S ) = |S |ε̄(S ) − |S | with ε̄(S ) := 1|S |
∑
i∈S εi for all S ∈ 2N . (1)
The first term captures the cooperation externalities. Note that all singletons
have a zero value, hence, players are homogeneous in their individual productivity.
Consider a coalition of more than one player. A coalition formed by players with
ε > 1 has value higher than zero, while a coalition formed by players with ε < 1
has value lower than zero. A mixed coalition formed by players of both types
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may have either higher, equal, or lower value than zero, depending on whether the
players with ε > 1 outweigh, balance, or have lower impact than the one of the
players with ε < 1.
Example 4.1 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and ε = (0.5, 1, 1, 1.5). Then the corresponding
cooperation externalities game (N, vε) is given by vε({1, 2}) = vε({1, 3}) = −0.318,
vε({2, 4}) = vε({3, 4}) = 0.378, vε({1, 2, 3}) = −0.502, vε({2, 3, 4}) = 0.603, and
vε(S ) = 0 otherwise.
The payoff configuration ({{1}, {2, 3, 4}}, (0, 0.201, 0.201, 0.201)) is an element
of the bargaining set B(vε) since it does not allow for any (internal or external)
objections. 
To facilitate the exposition below, we introduce the following additional no-
tation. The set of players with a cooperation externality parameter at least one is
denoted by H := {i ∈ N | εi ≥ 1}; the set of players with a cooperation externality
parameter lower than one is denoted by L := {i ∈ N | εi < 1}. The vector ε is
called symmetric if there are real numbers εH and εL such that εi = εH for all i ∈ H
and εi = εL for all i ∈ L. A cooperation externalities game is called symmetric if
the underlying vector ε is symmetric.
Theorem 4.2 Let (N, vε) be a symmetric cooperation externalities game with an
externality parameter εH ∈ [1, 2] for players in H and εL ∈ [0, 1) for players in
L. If εH + εL ≤ 2, then the coalition structure {H, 〈L〉} is stable. It is the unique
stable coalition structure if additionally εH > 1 and |H| , 1.
The proof requires three auxiliary results.
Lemma 4.3 Let s, t ∈ N such that s + t ≥ 3. Then
(s + t)s−t < ss. (2)
Proof. The following assertion is equivalent to (2)
( s + t
s
)s
< (s + t)t.





















Hence, for s + t ≥ 3, (2) is valid.
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Lemma 4.4 Let s, t ∈ [1,∞) and α ∈ [0,∞). Then
(s + t)α − sα − tα

> 0 for α ∈ (1,∞)
= 0 for α = 1
< 0 for α ∈ [0, 1)
(3)
Proof. Let g : [1,∞) × [1,∞) −→ R be defined by
g(s, t) = (s + t)α − sα − tα.
The first order derivative with respect to s, yields
g′s(s, t) = α(s + t)
α−1 − αsα−1,
which is positive for α > 1, zero for α = 1 and negative for α < 1. A similar
analysis holds for the first order derivative with respect to t. Furthermore,
g(1, 1) = 2α − 2,
which is positive for α > 1, zero for α = 1 and negative for α < 1. This completes
the proof.
Lemma 4.5 Let i ∈ L and S ⊆ N \ {i} such that vε(S ) ≥ 0. Then
vε(S ∪ {i}) ≤ vε(S ) + vε({i}).
Proof. Denote ε̄(S ) by ε. Because vε(S ) ≥ 0, we have that ε ≥ 1. Define
g : [1, 2] −→ R by
g(ε) = (s + 1)
sε+2−ε
s+1 − sε − 1.
Because εL ≤ 2 − ε, we have vε(S ∪ {i}) − vε(S ) − vε({i}) ≤ g(ε) for ε ∈ [1, 2].
Hence it suffices to show that g(ε) ≤ 0. If s = 1, then g(ε) = 0. If s ≥ 2, denote
(s + 1)
s−1
s+1 by a. So g(ε) = (s + 1)
2
s+1 · aε − sε − 1. Because of Lemma 4.3, we have
that a < s. Furthermore,
g′(ε) = ln(a) · (s + 1) 2s+1 · aε − ln(s) · sε.
If ε = 1, this boils down to
g′(1) = ln(a) · (s + 1) 2s+1 · a − ln(s) · s
= ln(s + 1) · s − 1
s + 1
· (s + 1) 2s+1 · (s + 1) s−1s+1 − ln(s) · s
= ln(s + 1) · (s − 1) − ln(s) · s
= ln(s + 1)(s−1) − ln ss,
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which is negative because of Lemma 4.3. Suppose ε is such that g′(ε) < 0. Then
g′′(ε) = ln2(a) · (s + 1) 2s+1 · aε − ln2(s) · sε
< ln(s) · ln(a) · (s + 1) 2s+1 · aε − ln2(s) · sε
= ln(s) · g′(ε)
< 0.
Summarizing we find g′(1) < 0 and g′′(ε) < 0 for all ε ∈ [1, 2] with g′(ε) < 0.
This implies that g′(ε) < 0 for all ε ∈ [1, 2]. Since g(1) = 0, this completes the
proof.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Let εH + εL ≤ 2. Consider the payoff configuration
({H, 〈L〉}, x) with x ∈ RN given by x := v(H)|H| eH. We show that ({H, 〈L〉}, x) ∈
B(vε).9,10 First, we show that there are no internal objections. Obviously, there
are no internal objections in {i} for all i ∈ L. Suppose there is an internal objection
of player k ∈ H against player l ∈ H using coalition T ⊆ H \ {l} with k ∈ T .
Then |T | ≥ 2, since vε({k}) = 0. Player l can use coalition Q = (T \ {k}) ∪ {l} to
counterobject since vε(T ) and vε(Q) coincide.
Next, we show that H is splitting-proof and 〈L〉 is merging-proof. For the
remainder of the proof we denote the cardinalities of the coalitions called S and
T by s and t, respectively. First, consider S , T ⊆ H such that S ∩ T = ∅ and
S ∪ T = H. Then
vε(H) − vε(S ) − vε(T ) = (s + t)εH − s − t − (sεH + tεH − s − t) ≥ 0,
where the last inequality follows from εH ≥ 1 and Lemma 4.4.
Next, consider i, j ∈ L. Then
vε({i, j}) − vε({i}) − vε({ j}) = (2)εL − 2 < 0,
where the last inequality follows from εL < 1.
In order for {H, 〈L〉} to be merging-proof, vε(H ∪ {i}) ≤ vε(H) + v({i}) for all
i ∈ L. This is the case because of lemma 4.5.
Finally, we show that there are no external objections by players in H. Since
vε({i, j}) ≤ 0 for all i ∈ H and j ∈ L, no player with εH can launch an external
objection.
In order to show the part of the proposition concerning uniqueness, we need to
prove that no coalition structure but {H, 〈L〉} is stable under the additional conditi-
ons εH > 1 and |H| ≥ 2. Let (P′, x) be an individually rational payoff configuration
of (N, v).
9In fact one can show that ({H, 〈L〉}, x) ∈ B(vε) ∩M(vε) ∩Z(vε).
10There are other payoff vectors pertaining to the coalition structure {{H}, 〈L〉} that lead to a
payoff configuration in our bargaining set, e.g., each element of the Core of the H-restricted game
and a zero payoff to all players in L.
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Firstly, if there are coalitions S ,T ∈ P′ with S ,T ⊂ H and S , T , then P′ is
not merging-proof with respect to these coalitions: Lemma 4.4 gives
vε(S + T ) − vε(S ) − vε(T ) = (s + t)εH − sεH − tεH > 0.
Next, suppose there is a player i ∈ L and a non-empty coalition S ⊆ N \ {i}
such that S ∪{i} ∈ P′. Because x is individually rational, vε(S ∪{i}) ≥ 0 and hence,
vε(S ) ≥ 0 as well. Moreover, lemma 4.5 gives vε(S ∪ {i}) ≤ vε(S ) + vε({i}). For
S ∪ {i} to be splitting proof, we need an equality. This is only the case when s = 1
and εH = 2 − εL. So let us focus on this case. Let S = { j}, and ε j = εH = 2 − εL.
We have vε(S ∪ {i}) = 0, so xi = x j = 0 as well. Since |H| ≥ 2, there must be
another coalition T ∈ P′ with T ∩H , ∅. Player j has a justified external objection
using coalition T ∪ { j} against player i, since
vε(T ∪ { j}) − vε(T ) = (t + 1)
tε̄(T )+εH
t+1 − tε̄(T ) − 1 > 0.
The inequality follows from 1 ≤ ε(T ) ≤ εH and Lemma 4.4. So, P′ is not stable.

Lemma 4.5 and the proof of Theorem 4.2 show that in a symmetric externa-
lities game (N, vε) with εH + εL ≤ 2 and εH > 1, all players in H have positive
externalities with respect to any coalition with a non-negative value, except for
singleton coalitions consisting of a member of L. All players in L have negative
externalities with respect to any coalition.
Next we will discuss the necessity of the various conditions provided in Theo-
rem 4.2 for the stability of the coalition structure {H, 〈L〉}. The first example shows
that when the cooperation externalities game is not symmetric, {H, 〈L〉} may not
be stable.
Example 4.6 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10}, ε = (1.1, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2, 2)
and H̃ := {i ∈ N | εi = 2}. The value function can be calculated using Equation
(1). Here we give just some of the values. vε({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N; vε(N) = 71.283,
vε(H̃) = 72. Note that H = N. The coalition structure {N} is not stable since it is
not splitting-proof. 
The next example illustrates the necessity of the condition that εH + εL ≤ 2.
Example 4.7 Let N = {1, 2, 3}, and ε = (0.9, 0.9, 1.9). The value function is cal-
culated using Equation (1) which yields vε({1, 2}) = −0.134, vε({1, 3}) = vε({2, 3}) =
0.639, vε({1, 2, 3}) = 0.876 and vε(S ) = 0, otherwise. The coalition structure
{{1}, {2}, {3}} is not stable since it is not merging proof. 
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The next example shows that the condition εH > 1 is necessary to obtain
uniqueness.
Example 4.8 Let N = {1, 2} and ε = (1, 1). So, v(S ) = 0 for all S ∈ 2N . Both
coalition structures {N} and {{1}, {2}} are stable since ({N}, (0, 0)) ∈ B(vε) and
({{1}, {2}}, (0, 0)) ∈ B(vε). 
In addition, to guarantee uniqueness in Theorem 4.2, it is required that |H| , 1.
The next example illustrates the necessity of this condition.
Example 4.9 Let N = {1, 2} and ε = (0.9, 1.1). Using equation (1), we obtain
vε(S ) = 0 for all S ∈ 2N . Both coalition structures {N} and {{1}, {2}} are stable
since ({N}, (0, 0)) ∈ B(vε) and ({{1}, {2}}, (0, 0)) ∈ B(vε). 
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